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Abstract 
This report presents the results of the author’s summer internship with Powerhouse 
Ventures Ltd. It is structured in two sections.  
The first describes the main theory and methodologies relevant to the practical assessment 
of ventures from a venture capital perspective. It goes into some detail, to demonstrate 
both the validity of the analysis that follows and the domain knowledge acquired by the 
student during the project.  
The second presents an analysis of the investment opportunity presented by Fibre-gen, 
identifying several areas of concern. It then outlines a similar potential venture that 
addresses these concerns and may represent an attractive opportunity for powerHouse.  
The report concludes with a series of recommendations for consideration by powerHouse, 
and a statement of the value gained by the student during the course of the project. 
In acknowledgement of the fact that this report considers a real, privately-held venture, a 
number of details have been redacted in this public release. Wherever this has occurred it 
has been indicated in the document. 
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Executive summary 
This project aimed to provide the student with experience in the venture capital industry 
and to assess an investment opportunity presented by Fibre-gen. This report summarises 
the project and is comprised of two sections: the first discusses the nature of venture 
capital, to demonstrate the domain knowledge gained by the student, while the second 
presents a summary of the Fibre-gen analysis. 
Venture capital  
Venture capital can be described using the concept of expectation outcomes to illustrate 
the two activities at its core: developing an accurate understanding of the potential pay-off 
and inherent risk in venture opportunities. The most significant of these risks is the market 
risk – the risk that insufficient customers find the venture’s value proposition compelling 
enough to pay for. 
Valuation 
There is no universally accepted analytical method for valuing early-stage companies. A 
number of different valuation approaches are discussed, but each is fundamentally limited 
by the assumptions forced upon them by the high uncertainty surrounding early-stage 
ventures.  
The powerHouse Way 
The Outcome Driven Innovation, Disruptive Innovation and Lean Startup methodologies 
constitute “The powerHouse Way”. These are intended to systematically reduce market risk 
and are at the heart of the work performed in this project. 
Outcome Driven Innovation is built upon the following steps: 
1. Identifying what job consumers are looking to achieve in a given situation. 
2. Defining consumers’ needs as the outcomes that determine the successful 
execution of that job – these are the metrics by which consumers measure a 
product’s performance and hence determine its value. 
3. Uncovering market opportunities by discovering where consumers are struggling to 
get a job done, or one where they are under- or over-served on key performance 
metrics.  
4. Using this information to construct a product that better addresses these key 
metrics, helping consumers get their job done significantly better. 
Disruptive Innovation describes a process by which a product or service takes root in simple 
applications at the low-end of a market, then rapidly develops, moves up-market and 
eventually displaces established competitors. In this type of process smaller companies are 
typically better able to compete with incumbents than in the typical process of sustaining 
innovation. 
The Lean Startup methodology defines the business plan of a new venture as a set of 
hypotheses. It then seeks to validate these through directly engaging with potential 
customers and developing the venture in stages through iterative, minimally-invested 
experiments. 
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Overall, The powerHouse Way provides a method of developing ventures to minimise 
market risk, by continually incorporating potential consumers and their needs into ventures’ 
development. It develops ventures in response to a perceptible market pull, promoting 
rapid customer uptake once product development is complete; meaning powerHouse-
backed ventures are more likely to succeed in the marketplace, increasing the value offered 
to their investors.  
Fibre-gen analysis 
Fibre-gen is a technology company spun out of Carter Holt Harvey during their 2005 
acquisition. Fibre-gen provides acoustic instruments which allow non-destructive 
measurement of a number of timber parameters, most significantly stiffness, throughout 
the timber supply-chain. Fibre-gen has expressed board-level interest in taking on 
investment to support their growth. 
The use of Fibre-gen’s tools allows industry members to more effectively manage the 
variation inherent in the wood resource. This variation impacts high-end structural wood 
processors most significantly, typically causing 10% of their products to fail during final 
quality testing. Fibre-gen addresses this by allowing timber processors to identify and 
remove the poorest 10% of logs from their supply – the logs that cause 90% of processing 
problems. To do so, it relies on growers using Fibre-gen’s tools early in the supply-chain, so 
that this information is available to processors purchasing timber down-stream. Fibre-gen 
motivates growers to do this by providing the opportunity to earn a premium for 
demonstrably stiff logs, and to identify those high-value logs that would otherwise be 
assumed to be of low-value. 
Fibre-gen is currently in the final stages of developing an application of their technology for 
timber processor-heads. This product is of the most significance for Fibre-gen, primarily as a 
result of its position at the beginning of the harvest-processor supply-chain and its potential 
to access a larger NZ$400m global annual market through a service-based business model. 
A number of concerns were raised with the investment opportunity presented by Fibre-gen 
in its current form, specifically: 
 A modest global market size; 
 Market validation finding that their value proposition to timber processors was not 
compelling – few were willing to pay; 
 Market trends towards the erosion of price premiums for quality logs, meaning 
growers have little motivation to demonstrate the stiffness of their logs; and 
 No fundamental change being identified that investment by powerHouse could be 
expected to make to prompt the significant growth required for Fibre-gen to 
provide a desirable return. 
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WoodCo 
It was determined that combining Fibre-gen’s technologies with tracking technology and 
other sensors in a new venture, “WoodCo”, would overcome the majority of the issues 
identified with the original venture. 
WoodCo would aim to provide the defining measure of wood quality at all stages in the 
supply-chain post-harvest. It would accomplish this by measuring a range of stiffness, 
strength and stability attributes at the point of harvest, tracking these against each 
individual log through RFID, and using this information to optimise wood-flow throughout 
the entire supply-chain through an online management system. 
This would address the same underlying problem as Fibre-gen, but provide a more 
compelling solution to customers. Specifically, it would allow: 
 Forest owners to optimise their returns by factoring transport costs into log-making 
decisions; 
 Harvest managers to optimise value recovery by better understanding timber 
quality, and to sell logs more effectively through quantification of their quality; 
 Timber processors to improve control over their output by increasing the 
consistency and availability of their supply; and 
 Timber end users to understand the origin and provenance of their products.  
Initial industry interviews validated the value of this proposition to market participants. 
This venture would operate under a service-based business model, whereby harvesters pay 
per m3 of timber managed using the system and recoup the cost by charging a premium to 
downstream entities. These entities are motivated to pay this premium in order to gain 
more control over their supply, as this decreases their processing costs while increasing 
their recovery of high-value products and process control. 
A top-down market sizing was necessitated by time constraints, which suggested the 
globally addressable market to be NZ$1.2b annually.  
The main assumptions to be tested to progress WoodCo further are: 
 Bottom-up market sizing identifies a significantly large market; 
 Licensing of the processor-head technology is amenable to Fibre-gen; 
 Appropriate RFID technology can be obtained, and cost-effectively and reliably 
applied; 
 Timber processors earn a significant premium for higher-quality products in all 
international markets; and 
 Timber harvesters will be willing to physically segregate logs. 
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Conclusions 
As a result of the work completed it was concluded that: 
 Fibre-gen do not appear to constitute an attractive investment opportunity as they 
currently are. 
 Any venture based on advanced technology must focus on appearing simple to 
foresters and focus messaging on the job it does for them.  
 There is a commercial opportunity to help the Forestry industry better manage its 
supply-chain and the inherent variability of wood. 
Recommendations 
As a result of the project’s findings it is recommended that powerHouse: 
 Begin to build an investment case for WoodCo by working to validate the 
assumptions listed above. 
 Establish a relationship with Scion, New Zealand’s primary forestry research group, 
to source future potential ventures. 
 Investigate the commercial potential of research being conducted at the University 
of Canterbury into the application of telematics for machine-control in the Forestry 
industry. 
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Disclaimer 
This report has been prepared in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Engineering Management at the University of Canterbury. It is intended for use by 
Powerhouse Ventures Ltd.  
In acknowledgement of the fact this report considers a real, privately-held venture, a 
number of details have been redacted in this public release. Wherever this has occurred it 
has been indicated in the document. 
While the author has taken care to make sound recommendations, they accept no 
responsibility for the accuracy of, nor occurrences resulting from, the use of conclusions 
drawn or recommendations made in this report. 
A copy of this report will be submitted to the University of Canterbury on Friday 28/02/2014 
in partial fulfilment of the MEM degree requirements. It will be embargoed from 
distribution for two years from this date. If no application is made to extend this bar, the 
project will be made available for unrestricted access via the University’s online research 
repository as of 28/02/2015.  
A copy will also be made available to Powerhouse Ventures Ltd on the condition that neither 
the student, the supervisor, nor the University of Canterbury will bear any legal 
responsibility for the statements made herein. If Powerhouse Ventures Ltd intends to rely 
on the contents of this report or to implement any of its recommendations, it must do so 
solely on its own judgment. 
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Glossary 
Bucking. The process of cutting a stem into logs. Also known as merchandising or 
logmaking. 
Downgrade. Lumber which is cut to structural dimensions but fails the stress grading 
process. 
Felling. The act of cutting down a tree. 
Grade recovery. The percentage of a log’s volume recovered as structural grade lumber. 
Knotty core size. Diameter of tree when pruned – high value clear lumber can only be 
recovered outside this zone. 
Lumber. Timber that has been processed into battens, beams .etc. 
MFA. Microfibril Angle. Refers to the angle of the microfibrils which make up the S2 layer of 
a wood fibre. Impacts many different macro properties. One of the most important micro 
properties. 
MSG. Machine Stress Graded timber. Normally done by using an acoustic grading machine. 
Required for most structural applications.  
Processor-head. A device attached to the end of a crane or tractor which grapples, fells, 
delimbs and bucks a tree into logs in a single operation. 
Pulplog. A low value log intended for pulping. 
Sawlog. A higher value log intended for structural or industrial end use. 
SED. Small end diameter. The diameter of a log at its smallest end. 
Stands. Sections or blocks within a forest. 
Timber. Trees that have been felled but not processed - e.g. logs, stems. 
Tracheid. A wood-fibre. 
Volume recovery. The percentage of a log’s volume recovered as lumber of any kind. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Project purpose 
This project set out to analyse and shape the investment opportunity presented by Fibre-
gen Ltd (hereafter “Fibre-gen”) on behalf of Powerhouse Ventures Ltd (hereafter 
“powerHouse”). Specifically, the objectives were to: 
1. Provide powerHouse with an analysis that could be relied upon to inform 
investment decisions regarding Fibre-gen;  
2. Provide the student (Daniel Maxwell) with an opportunity to learn about, and gain 
experience in, the real-world assessment of venture opportunities; and  
3. Satisfy the requirements of the student’s Master of Engineering Management 
qualification. 
1.2 This report 
This report presents the results of the project and is structured in two sections. The first 
describes the main theory and methodologies relevant to the project: it goes into some 
detail, to demonstrate both the validity of the following analysis and the domain knowledge 
acquired by the student during the project. The second section presents the results of the 
Fibre-gen analysis.  
A significant amount of supporting information is included amongst the appendices. This is 
done both to support brevity in the presentation of the analysis, and to provide 
powerHouse with a source of relevant information should they choose to proceed with 
investment in Fibre-gen, or any other in the Forestry Industry.  
It should be noted that a vast trove of information exists on the assessment of ventures and 
similar topics – entrepreneurship is very much in vogue – but that much of this information 
is idealised and ill-informed. Consequently, care has been taken when conducting this 
research to only rely on information from respected publications and eschew that described 
by many as “business porn” (Aarons-Mele, 2014, Adams, 2002). 
1.3 powerHouse  
powerHouse is an intellectual property commercialisation company. Their core business is 
the creation of value for their investors through the commercialisation of intellectual 
property, primarily originating from Universities and Research Institutes. They focus on 
early-stage, high-tech companies to whom they can add the most value through their 
expertise and incubation services. 
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Definition: Expectation Value 
(Grinstead and Snell, 1997) 
Let 𝑥 be a numerically-valued 
discrete random variable with 
sample space  and distribution 
function  𝑥 . The expectation 
value is then defined by: 
provided the sum converges 
absolutely. 
  𝑥  ∑ 𝑥  𝑥 
   
  
2. Venture Capitali 
“Venture capitalists are often regarded as a mystical priesthood who practice an 
elusive, intuitive high art. However, like an assembly line, venture capitalists take 
inputs, add value, and produce outputs. They buy businesses, add capital and 
expertise, and then sell those businesses for a higher price.” 
– Thomas Thurston (Thurston, 2013) 
At its core, venture capital is about expected 
outcomes – codified by the concept of expectation 
values. In the context of investment, expectation 
values can be reframed as 
      ∑              
where if     , the expected outcome of the 
investment, is larger than the opportunity cost (e.g. 
the result that would be expected from the next 
best/no investment), then the investor is expected to 
be better off for having taken the risk. While this by no 
means provides a guarantee for any single investment, its application over a large set of 
such investments would be expected to make a good returns on the funds investedii 
(Rosenman, 2013, Mauboussin, 2005, Lo, 2001, Sharpe, 2007). 
“Take the probability of loss times the amount of possible loss from the probability 
of gain times the amount of possible gain. That is what we’re trying to do. It’s 
imperfect, but that’s what it’s all about.” 
– Warren Buffettiii  
The importance of expectation values is best seen through consideration of Samuelson’s 
famous lunch bet to his colleague: 
“Let’s flip a coin – if you call it right you win $200, if you call it wrong you lose 
$100.” 
The colleague declined, but stated that he would have accepted a series of 100 such bets. 
The expectation value of the situation shows the bet to be heavily in the favour of the 
colleague: 
                                                          
i
 This report uses “venture capital” as a blanket term to cover the gamut of private-equity 
investments made in growing or early-stage businesses. 
ii
 This is somewhat of a simplification, not taking into consideration variation or outright loss 
probabilities, but serves to illustrate the point. It also explains the recent trend towards startup 
“accelerators” – where large numbers of small, high-risk, high-return investments increase the 
likelihood that the expectation value will be achieved. 
iii
 Attributed in MAUBOUSSIN, M. 2005. Attributes of a Good Investment Process - The Critical Role of 
Decision Making. In: SUNDER, S. (ed.) Yale School of Managament Lecture Series. Yale University: Legg 
Mason Capital Management. 
17/02/2014 Building an investment case. Version 3.1 Page 3 of 53 
Assessing risk  
The Bell-Mason diagnostic is a tool 
that can be used in the assessment 
of ventures at different stages. It 
plots the perceived strength of a 
venture opportunity against 12 key 
risk dimensions. It allows the 
implicit risk in a venture to be 
quickly and holistically understood, 
measured against predefined 
criteria, and for the progress of a 
venture to be demonstrated. 
 
Figure 1: Bell-Mason Diagnostic (Bell, 
2000)  
 
                              
        
That is, from an actuarial point of view he should still have taken the betiv (Samuelson, 1963, 
Kahneman and Tversky, 2000, Kahneman, 2011).  
While not explicitly used in this project, the expectation value concept illustrates the nature 
of the work carried out – developing an accurate understanding of the risks involved, 
identifying means of mitigating them, and developing an idea for the magnitude of potential 
pay-offs. 
2.1 Key risk factors 
70-90% of new businesses and product lines fail (Christensen et al., 2005, Adams, 2010, 
Ulwick, 2005, Blank, 2013). While there are innumerable factors that ultimately contribute 
to this, the following are the most significant when assessing early stage businesses (Bell, 
2000, Payne, 2007a, Adams, 2010, Loy, 2013, Roberts 
and Barley, 2005). 
2.1.1 Market risk 
This is the risk that there are an insufficient number of 
consumers willing to pay the required price for a 
product for it to attain the revenues required to 
generate an appropriate investment return.  
This has three main elements: ensuring that the 
offering developed meets a true customer need, that 
the addressable market is of sufficient size – normally 
>US$500 million (Adams, 2010, Roberts and Barley, 
2005), and that the market size is not likely to decline 
over the period of the investment.  
This risk is largely controllable by investors through 
validating market needs and value propositions, and 
through careful analysis of market sizes and trends.  
2.1.2 Management risk 
This is the risk that the management of a venture do 
not have the skills, domain knowledge or experience necessary to successfully implement 
the business plan.  
This is somewhat controllable by investors through analysis of the people involved, their 
qualifications and experience, and through investment terms which afford investors either 
dominant governance positions or the explicit ability to replace management should they 
deem it necessary. 
  
                                                          
iv
 Though humans rarely take an actuarial view as a result of risk aversion; a fascinating phenomenon 
unfortunately outside the scope of this paper. 
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2.1.3 Competitive risk 
This is the risk that customers will prefer competitors’ existing solutions over a new product, 
or that competitors will be able to rapidly react to a new market entrant without significant 
competitive disadvantage. 
Investors generally look to mitigate this by ensuring invested ventures have a significant, 
defensible IP advantage – primarily through patents, trade-secrets and unique capabilities – 
or that the market in which they operate features significant financial, technological, or 
other barriers to entry. 
2.1.4 Technology risk 
This is the risk that the promise of a technology cannot ultimately be fulfilled – that is, that it 
cannot ultimately deliver the hypothesised value proposition. This could be either due to 
technical limitations, budget and timeframe limitations, or through the loss of key expertise 
with the loss of key individuals within the company. 
Investors are able to mitigate this in a number of ways: many choose to operate only in 
domains in which they, or consultants acting on their behalf, enjoy significant expert 
knowledge; many invest only once a working prototype has been developed; and many 
work to ensure key personnel’s incentives are aligned with those of the investors – usually 
through the grant of vested stock or stock options – and insist on “key man” life insurance 
policies.  
2.1.5 Exit Risk 
This is the risk that an investment will not be able to be readily liquidated; i.e. that the 
company is not acquired, sellable through private equity markets, and is inappropriate for 
IPO. It is the risk that any return will be ultimately unable to be realised. 
This is primarily mitigated by investors identifying analogous companies which have 
successfully exited as precedents, and by identifying an exit strategy and planning for exit 
from the point of investment. 
2.1.6 Financial risk 
This is the risk that the capital required to successfully develop, launch and grow a venture 
will be unable to be attained, or that doing so will significantly dilute the investors’ holding 
to the point that it will no longer generate a desirable return. 
This can be mitigated by investors by forecasting a venture’s future capital requirements, 
identifying the most appropriate milestones at which to attract future investment, and 
factoring the associated dilution into their return calculations for the initial investment. 
Many investors guard against this dilution through a rule of thumb whereby they only look 
for investments capable of potentially offering a 30x return – meaning they can still receive 
a good return even with significant dilution in subsequent rounds (Villalobos, 2007). 
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2.2 Risk management 
Due to the unavoidability of risk in venture capital, it is important that funds have effective 
risk management procedures. While a full discussion of fund risk management techniques is 
outside the scope of this project, the following are the key methods employed by venture 
capital firms:  
 The primary method of risk management in investment funds is through the 
diversification of investments. This is generally accomplished by spreading 
investments across a range of unrelated sectors and development stagesv. This 
minimizes both firm-specific risks and also risks relating to macro-variables, such as 
legislative changes which can rapidly impact entire industries (Dunne-Schmitt, 
2004).  
 Co-investment serves both to diversify risk by allowing larger numbers of smaller, 
diversified investments, and to reduce risk by implementing a “peer-review” of 
investment cases (Kut et al., 2007). 
 Staged financing, contingent on the achievement of risk-reducing milestones, allows 
risks to be minimised before significant resources are committed (Kut et al., 2007, 
Loy, 2013). 
“Funding has the potential to turn a little failure into an enormous one.” 
– Carmen Nobel (Nobel, 2011) 
 Financial contracting measures, including board composition, liquidation 
preference, and anti-dilution clauses, are often included in term sheets. Terms such 
as these can be used to mitigate specific risks, and as such are an important factor 
when considering any deal (Kut et al., 2007, Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). 
2.3 Valuation methods 
“Many consider the valuation of a closely held business akin to alchemy.” 
– Darryl Waldron and Carl Hubbard (Waldron and Hubbard, 1991) 
Theoretically, the valuation of a business is determined by the net present value of its future 
cash-flow streams, discounted for risk (Loy, 2013, Whittington, 2013) and future dilution 
(Sahlman, 2009). In practise, however, discounted cash-flow analyses are of little relevance 
to early-stage companies as both the future cash-flows and the risk discount rate are highly 
speculative (Loy, 2013, Ge et al., 2005). In fact, there is no universally accepted analytical 
methodology for assigning value to a pre-revenue start-up company (Payne, 2007a, Ge et 
al., 2005, Whittington, 2013).  
The reality is that a number of different approaches should be employed so that a 
“reasonable” amount can be determined on which to base negotiations. The following are 
three key approaches used in industry. 
  
                                                          
v
 It should be noted that some funds will choose to specialise in a sector if they believe their domain 
knowledge affords them benefits which outweigh the inherent risk of investing in a single sector. 
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Definition: Information Asymmetry 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001, 
Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009) 
Information asymmetry refers to the 
inherent information imbalance in the 
investor-entrepreneur dyad.  
Typically, entrepreneurs will know much 
more than investors about the venture, 
and often the industry, in question.  
Conversely, investors are typically much 
better informed than entrepreneurs 
about the importance of seemingly 
innocuous investment terms, and of the 
different methods available for valuing 
companies. 
As their incentives, particularly while 
closing an investment deal, can be seen 
to be in opposition, each party is often 
not motivated to be fully forthright with 
the other. 
2.3.1 Venture-capital method 
The venture-capital is a commonly-used method which calculates the value of a venture 
that would satisfy investment criteria, based on an assumed exit valuation. This essentially 
represents what the venture is worth to a particular investor. It does so by determining and 
combining the price:earnings ratiovi typical of the market category in which the venture 
operates, its forecast earnings at exit, and the desired ROIvii into the following simple 
formulaviii (Payne, 2007b, Damodaran, 2009, Sahlman, 2009): 
                     
                                       
                   
  
While useful to establish a “ball-park” figure, this method is driven more by the needs of the 
investor than the economic reality, and thus cannot be relied upon in isolation to determine 
a venture’s value. 
2.3.2 Market method 
Ultimately, anything is ultimately only worth 
what someone is willing to pay. This is the 
principle at the core of the market method, 
which looks to identify the prices commanded 
by “similar” ventures – ideally of the same size, 
stage and industry – which are used to deduce a 
valuation for the venture in question 
(Damodaran, 2012, Ranade, 2008, Whittington, 
2013).  
In early-stage ventures, outright, public sales 
are uncommon; instead values are inferred 
from the investments of other firms into 
companies in the same sector, values which can 
commonly be found in media releases, financial 
statements, and US Securities and Exchange 
Commission disclosures. 
This method is appealing as it is driven by third-
party information, and hence is less likely to be 
unduly influenced by information asymmetry or the desires of the investors or venture 
owners (Whittington, 2013). It is limited in most cases by the capacity to find multiple 
ventures which are truly “similar” to early-stage, novel ventures. 
  
                                                          
vi
 Widely published and used throughout the finance industry. 
vii
 Adapted for dilution if further rounds are expected. Many investors simply apply a rule of thumb 
ROI of 30x, which allows a good return even with significant dilution (also known as divergence). 
viii
 Or a permutation thereof. 
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2.3.3 Risk-factor summation methods 
Risk factor-summation methods for valuing early-stage companies revolve around the 
observation that the most early ventures are fundamentally similar and valued within a 
relatively well-defined range (Payne, 2007a). Ventures are then quantitatively assessed (e.g. 
rated as “very safe” through to “very risky”) against a number of key risk-factors, and then 
their position within the valuation range determined by a weighted function of their risk 
factor scores (Ge et al., 2005, Payne, 2007a). 
Many similar “scorecard” methods can also be found that determine valuations based on 
scaling of an investment within a range – most notably that method of Dave Berkus which 
assesses the “value” of an early stage business based on 5 simple yes or no criteria. These 
methods are gaining in popularity due to their simplicity, their transparency and fact that 
more rigorous rarely attain better results in situations characterised by such a high level of 
uncertainty (Payne, 2013). 
“Measure with a micrometer, mark with chalk, cut with an axe.” 
– American Proverb 
3. The powerHouse Way 
“Innovation is not an initiative; it is a business process. The process begins with 
market selection and includes steps to uncover customer needs, determine which 
needs are unmet, select a growth strategy and devise and evaluate product and 
service concepts.” 
Definition of Innovation – Anthony Ulwick (Ulwick, 2009) 
It is commonly held that the predominant reason for product failure is that the product 
doesn’t sell; not that it cannot be built (Adams, 2002, Adams, 2010, Schneider and Hall, 
2011, Ulwick, 2005). Hence, in the context of assessing early stage ventures it is the wide 
body of innovation literature, with its focus on market risk, which can be seen to be the 
most relevant. The following are those elements of this literature that constitute “The 
powerHouse Way”, and have been referred to during this project. 
3.1 Outcome driven innovation 
“This is the dirty little secret of innovation: despite all the talk about satisfying 
customer needs, there is very little understanding of what a customer need is – 
what its purpose, structure, content and syntax should be.” 
– Anthony Ulwick (Ulwick, 2009) 
At its core, Outcome Driven Innovation (ODI) is a process of identifying metrics, or 
outcomes, by which consumers will judge a product’s value, and then systematically using 
them to develop products that consumers value (Ulwick, 2005). It looks to do this primarily 
through the application of the following three principles. 
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Definition: Jobs to be done, 
Outcomes, Constraints 
(Ulwick, 2005)  
The jobs to be done can be 
defined as the fundamental goals 
customers are trying to accomplish 
or problems they are trying to 
solve in a given situation. They can 
be further subcategorised into 
functional jobs – the tasks people 
seek to accomplish, emotional jobs 
– the way people want to feel in a 
given circumstance, and social jobs 
– how people want to be 
perceived by others. 
The outcomes are the metrics by 
which customers measure how 
well they are able to carry out a 
job using a product or service. 
The constraints are the factors 
that may prevent a customer from 
adopting or using the product or 
service. 
3.1.1 When it comes to innovation, the job, not the product, must be the unit of 
analysis 
 “People don’t want to buy a quarter inch drill. They want a quarter inch hole!” 
– Theodore Levitt (Christensen et al., 2005) 
At the heart of ODI is the theory that consumers 
fundamentally ‘hire’ products to get jobs done. That is, 
whenever they use a product or service they are 
essentially ‘hiring’ it – paying with their effort, 
attention and other resources – in order to accomplish 
a task or achieve a goal (Christensen and Raynor, 
2003, Christensen et al., 2005, Bettencourt and 
Ulwick, 2008, Ulwick, 2009, Ulwick, 2005).  
For example, a consumer of a hybrid car may have a 
functional job of getting where they want to go quickly 
but with minimal environmental impact, an emotional 
job of feeling good that they’re being environmentally 
conscious, and a social job to be seen by others as 
someone who is environmentally conscious.  
Identifying the job to be done is not necessarily 
straightforward, as shown by an investigation into 
milkshakes for a large US chain: it found that the 
majority of consumers primarily bought milkshakes 
either to alleviate the boredom of a long commute to 
work, or to placate their children and feel they are 
loving parents. These findings allowed the chain to 
identify a range of potential improvements: to tackle 
the “boring commute” job they could swirl in chunks of fruit – meaning the consumers 
would at random encounter one, further breaking up the monotony of the commute – and 
to tackle the “looking after the child” job, they could serve it in a smaller, less viscous shake 
– minimising expense and avoid unduly delaying the parent while still satisfying the child 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
3.1.2 When the job is the unit of analysis, a need takes the form of a consumer-
defined metric  
“The literal voice of the customer sidetracks the innovation process because 
customers are not qualified to know what solutions are best – that is the job of the 
organization.” 
– Anthony Ulwick (Ulwick, 2005) 
The second principle is that consumers’ needs are determined not by asking consumers 
what they need – as they are seldom able to articulate it – but by thoroughly understanding 
what it is they are looking to achieve when carrying out a job. For instance, a farmer whose 
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job is to grow corn may be looking to achieve outcomes such as minimising the time it takes 
corn seeds to germinate or maximising the number of seeds that germinate at the same 
time (Ulwick, 2005). 
Essentially, once the job is the unit of focus, consumer needs are made clear as those things 
that must be measured, controlled or defined to ensure the job is executed with the speed, 
predictability and outputs that the consumers desire. These needs are the outcomes the 
consumer is looking to achieve, and the metrics by which they will evaluate a product’s 
ability to carry out the job and hence its value (Ulwick, 2005, Ulwick and Bettencourt, 2008). 
Once the metrics for a job have been identified, it is possible to systematically assess how 
well current or competing solutions perform, and identify opportunities for disruptive 
innovation where these needs are over-served, sustaining innovation where a number of 
key metrics are underserved, and new-market innovation where no options exist to help 
certain consumers complete a job (Ulwick, 2005, Christensen, 1997, Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003, Ulwick and Bettencourt, 2008). 
3.1.3 A job map provides the structure needed to ensure all consumer needs are 
captured 
The final principle of ODI is based on the observation that the majority of jobs can be broken 
down into a common set of process steps. It then uses these common steps as a framework 
to systematically identify all the outcomes consumers are looking to achieve, offering 
guidance for innovation opportunities at each step (Bettencourt and Ulwick, 2008, Ulwick, 
2005). The steps of ODI’s “universal job map” are outlined in the following table. 
Step Description Innovation 
opportunities 
Example 
1: Define Determine 




Weight Watchers streamlines diet planning by 
offering a system that doesn’t require calorie 
counting. 
2: Locate Gather items 
and 
information 
needed to do 
the job. 
Making required 






U-Haul provides consumers with prepackaged 
moving kits containing the number and types 
of boxes required for a move. 
3: Prepare Set up the 
environment 
to do the job. 
Making set-up 
less difficult and 
creating proper 
guides to ensure 
proper set-up of 
the work area. 
Bosch added adjustable levers to its circular 
saw to accommodate common bevel angles 
used by roofers to cut wood. 
4: Confirm Verify that 
they’re ready 
to do the job. 
Giving consumers 
information they 
need to confirm 
readiness. 
Oracle’s ProfitLogic merchandising 
optimization software confirms optimal timing 
and level of a store’s markdowns for each 
product. 
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Kimberly-Clark’s Patient Warning System 
automatically circulates heated water through 
thermal pads placed on surgery patients to 
maintain their normal body temperature 
during surgery. 
6: Monitor Assess 
whether the 







Nike makes a running shoe containing a sensor 
that communicates audio feedback about 
time, distance, pace, and calories burned to an 
iPod worn by the runner. 





need to make 
alterations and 
the number of 
alterations 
needed. 
By automatically downloading and installing 
updates, Microsoft’s operating systems 
remove hassle for computer users. People 
don’t have to determine which updates are 
necessary, find the updates, or ensure the 
updates are compatible with their operating 
system. 
8: Conclude Finish the job 








3M makes a wound dressing that stretches and 
adheres only to itself— not to patients’ skin or 
sutures. It thus offers a convenient way for 
medical personnel to secure dressings at the 
conclusion of treatment and then remove 
them after a wound has healed. 
Table 1: Job map and innovation opportunities (Bettencourt and Ulwick, 2008) 
3.1.4 Criticism of ODI 
Ulwick’s views are not without criticism. Gerry Katz – Executive VP of Applied Marketing 
Science, Inc – has labelled them as “dangerously test[ing] the limits of generally accepted 
good practise” (Katz, 2008). When assessed fully, however, this criticism can be seen to 
revolve around rebutting Ulwick’s assertion that ODI is completely different to existing Voice 
of the Customer techniques, as opposed to the validity of the approach itself. 
“In proposing his method, Ulwick disparages several other techniques; 
nevertheless, the reader should remember that techniques are often erroneously 
labelled as flawed when in fact they are misapplied or poorly executed.” 
– Jeffrey Pinegar (Pinegar, 2006) 
3.2 Disruptive innovation 
Clayton Christensen’s theory of innovation describes the ways in which new innovations can 
be introduced to the market, and how new market-entrants can effectively compete with 
larger incumbent organisations. Fundamentally, it does this by dividing innovations into two 
categories, described below and depicted in Figure 2.  
Sustaining innovations. These are systematic innovations that improve products along key 
performance metrics in order to attract a quality premium from customers. In sustaining 
innovation, incumbent organisations are well-resourced to defend against new market 
entrants, meaning these new entrants will seldom be able to effectively compete. As 
companies tend to innovate faster than consumers’ needs evolve, they risk over-serving the 
needs of lower-end consumers, “opening the door” to disruptive innovation by competitors 
(Christensen, 1997, Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
17/02/2014 Building an investment case. Version 3.1 Page 11 of 53 
Disruptive innovations. These are innovations that initially perform worse than existing 
products along a number of key performance metrics, but at much lower cost or with 
significantly increased simplicity or convenience – often as the result of a fundamentally 
new approach or technology. These innovations are typically able to capture low-
performance market niches with little difficulty, as incumbents rarely respond strongly to 
threats in their lower-margin operations. In many cases, these new approaches enable new 
entrants to rapidly enter higher-end market segments by improving  performance while 
maintaining lower costs, until they are able to displace incumbents and come to dominate 
entire markets (Christensen, 1997, Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
 
Figure 2: Christensen's Innovation model (Nelson, 2013) 
3.3 The Lean Startup 
Eric Ries’ Lean Startup methodology is rapidly being adopted by new ventures. Its central 
postulate is that nothing is known in a new venture’s business plan; it is merely a series of 
hypotheses. It then defines a young venture or “start-up” as an organization searching for 
and validating a sustainable business model through the systematic validation of these 
hypotheses (Ries, 2011, Blank, 2013, Eisenmann et al., 2012, Moogk, 2012).  
To do this validation, the method uses two core techniques. The first is to get “out of the 
building” (Blank, 2013, Ries, 2011). By this, it quite literally means that those involved with 
the venture should go and engage directly with potential customers in their hypothesised 
target market. In doing so, it aims to provide an initial test of the hypotheses in the business 
plan. Most importantly, it looks to validate the “value hypothesis” – that the problem or job 
identified is significant enough that consumers will be motivated to try, and ultimately pay 
for, a product that solves it.  
The second method, to complete the validation of these hypotheses, is to implement the 
business plan through the continual use of minimally invested experiments, or minimum 
viable products. Behavioural consumer responses are consistently measured in each of 
these experiments through predetermined metrics which directly relate to business 
outcomes. The method then promotes rapid iteration through a build-measure-learn cycle, 
systematically combining successful experiments to build an organisation with a proven, 
sustainable business plan.  
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This method offers two key advantages: it promotes customer intimacy in every stage of 
business development, and means that the amount invested grows only as the risk of the 
venture decreases. 
3.3.1 Criticism 
“You got to get the rocket into space.” 
– Marc Andreessen (Kern, 2012) 
The Lean Startup has attracted significant criticism. But again, in the same fashion as that of 
ODI, this criticism is fundamentally based around the ways in which it is applied, as opposed 
to the methodology itself. Notable Silicon Valley VC and Entrepreneur Mark Andreessen 
sums up the main criticisms as falling into three categories (Kern, 2012):  
1. The Lean Startup approach is not appropriate to every venture type, 
2. The Lean Startup can be interpreted as de-emphasising traditional sales and 
marketing in the favour of product development, and 
3. In promoting “fast failure” through disproving hypotheses, it promotes ventures 
giving up too easily. 
3.4 Summary 
In order to maximise the value it offers investors, powerHouse applies these methodologies 
to de-risk investments by: 
 Identifying key jobs to be done by consumers, and key metrics for each of these 
jobs, through interaction with consumers in the target market. 
 Identifying competitors by looking at other ways that consumers can complete the 
same job, not just directly competing productsix. 
 Assessing whether existing solutions and competitors under- or over-serve 
consumers on any key metrics when executing the job. 
 Assessing the venture’s ability to satisfy these metrics comparatively. 
 Sizing markets based on people needing to get certain jobs donex, and looking to 
invest only in opportunities where large groups of customers are struggling to get a 
job done.  
 Launching ventures into market niches that are most under- or over- served – those 
with the greatest market pain. 
 Looking to position ventures to disrupt markets, where possible, in order to provide 
early revenues to support product development and to reduce competitive risk. 
 Investing in small amounts, with each funding round looking to validate a key 
hypothesis in the business plan, e.g. the value proposition or growth strategy 
hypothesis. 
 
                                                          
ix
 For instance, by considering cellphones as competitors for watches – both address the same 
fundamental functional job of telling the time. 
x
 As opposed to demographic-based market sizing, for instance. 
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Key wood properties (Walker, 2006) 
The properties that determine the quality of wood depend on the particular end use. Each of these is 
driven by a number of micro properties. The key macro-properties covering most industrial and 
structural end-uses are strength, stiffness, and stability. 
Strength refers to the maximum load that wood can bear before rupture. 
Stiffness refers to the deflection wood experiences under a given load. It is strongly correlated to 
strength.  
Stability refers to the ability of wood to maintain its shape, especially as lumber, post -processing.  
Density refers to two parameters: the green density, largely driven by moisture content, and the 
basic or oven-dry density. The importance of density is widely misunderstood in industry. For more 
information see (Walker, 2006). 
4. Fibre-gen 
Fibre-gen is a technology company spun out by Carter Holt Harvey during their acquisition 
by the Rank Group in 2005. They provide acoustic instruments which allow the non-
destructive measurement of wood stiffness throughout the timber supply-chain.  
They have experienced some small commercial success in the subsequent years, but have 
recently expressed a board-level “interest” in taking on investment to finish the 
development of their new processor-head unit and accelerate their growth. 
4.1 Forestry industry overview 
The Forestry industry can be divided into two main groups: growers and processors. Due to 
the inherent variability in wood properties – between forests, between trees, and within 
logs – a large number of processor-types have evolved to process timber in different quality 
bands. High-end processors want timber which is largely knot-free, stiff, stable, and strong; 
low-end pulp mills have almost no quality requirements for their inbound supply. Each 
processor determines their own specifications, including length, for incoming logs; standard 
grades are rarely used.  
 
Figure 3: Forestry industry supply-chain 
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4.2 Market problem 
Approximately 10-20% of processed softwoods fail to meet the minimum requirements for 
the machine grading (Gardiner and Moore, 2009, Reynolds, 2010, Mochan et al., 2009) 
which is mandated for high-value structural timber in most jurisdictions. This is generally 
due to the timber failing during stress grading because it doesn’t meet stiffness 
requirements (Gardiner and Moore, 2009, Reynolds, 2010), or because it distorts upon 
drying (Reynolds, 2010). Log purchasers currently base their specifications on external 
characteristics and knowledge of broad geographic strength trends, but still have significant 
variability in their supply. The worst ~10% of these logs are commonly attributed with 
causing ~90% of processing issues. 
There are substantial costs associated with such downgrades; they must be sold at lower 
prices for non-structural uses. Currently, in NZ markets, this price differential is ≈$300m-3 – a 
50% price reduction from structural lumberxi. Operating costs are also increased since 
timber is transported, processed and kiln-dried before it is strength graded; energy intensive 
processes which can account for more than half the cost of a finished timber product 
(Gardiner and Moore, 2009, Visser, 2014). 
4.2.1 Job to be done 
The job to be done by Fibre-gen is to prevent variation in wood quality from negatively 
impacting on profits. The group currently most under-served are primary wood processors, 
specifically structural timber and laminated veneer lumber (LVL) mills. Their key metrics are: 
 Maximising volume recovery, 
 Maximising grade recovery, 
 Maximising yield predictability,  
 Maximising acceptable wood supply, 
 Minimising the rate of timber downgrade, 
 Minimising log transport distances, and 
 Minimising the price paid for logs. 
Their key constraint is that of additional capital investment into what is already a capital-
intensive industry. 
4.3 Solution 
Fibre-gen produces tools which measure the acoustic velocity within logs and standing 
trees, a measurement which is strongly correlated to a number of wood quality parameters 
– most notably stiffness. This allows log populations to be segregated into quality classes 
and put to optimal end uses. These products either utilise a resonance-based velocity 
measure on processed logs, or a less-accurate time of flight measure for standing trees and 
felled stems. 
Logs with a high acoustic velocity have higher average stiffness. This means they can have 
structural-grade lumber cut from closer to the pith of the log – which increases grade 
recovery – and experience lower rates of downgrade. Additionally, it allows the strong logs 
                                                          
xi
 Figure from industry interviews. 
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in otherwise marginal forests to be identified – increasing the supply of acceptably strong 
logs and identifying those closest to high-end processors. Finally, by promoting more 
consistency in processors’ feedstock, Fibre-gen increases the predictability of their yields. 
 
Figure 4: Acoustic velocity distribution of Radiata Pines from two stands. Figure from (Dyck, 2003). 
Fibre-gen applies their acoustic technology through four products which are relevant at 
different stages of the supply-chain.  
Product Price Notes 
HM200 $12,000 Handheld unit for assessing felled trees and logs. Has had solid sales 
of approximately $1.5mxii to date and is well-known in industry. 
Value proposition (VP): Get more money for logs by matching each 
to the highest value appropriate end-use. 
ST300 $12,000 Handheld unit for assessing standing trees. Few have been sold to 
date. Very poor reputation in industry. 
VP: Increase accuracy of grade yield predictions. Increase accuracy 
of stand valuations and harvest plans. 
LG640 $150,000 Mill-based unit for assessing logs as part of the processing line. 
Design has been licensed out to another company and is no longer a 
focus. 
VP: Increase recovery of high-grade timber. Reduce costs of 
processing poor logs. 
PH330 $88,000 Processor head based unit. Development is incomplete, but believed 
to be in its final stages. 
VP: Make best log-making decisions e.g. if wood is structural quality 
cut to structural length. 
Table 2: Current Fibre-gen product line 
They currently operate under a standard product-sales model. However, CEO [redacted] has 
mentioned moving to a service-based business model for the processor-head unit once 
development is complete. 
                                                          
xii
 Inferred from current annual sales of 20 unit sales per year. 
These are the logs that cause ≈90% of 
quality issues during structural processing. 
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These products all represent new market innovations – before Fibre-gen released their 
products foresters weren’t able to measure internal timber qualities in any systematic way. 
Fibre-gen is able to protect this new market from competitors through a small portfolio of 3 
patents in key markets – detailed in Appendix A. Several other companies produce products 
for acoustically measuring stiffness in an arboricultural setting, but none have the required 
robustness to be applied in main-stream forestry. 
Fibre-gen uses no particularly rare components and outsources its manufacturing, meaning 
there are no likely scalability issues while operating under their sales model. Operating the 
Fibre-gen units under a service model may introduce scalability issues by virtue of the 
capital costs required to install the hardware in the initial stages. 
4.3.1 Processor-head unit (PH330) 
It was concluded that most of Fibre-gen’s potential lies in the PH330, primarily as a result of 
its position at the start of the supply-chain and its potential to access a much larger market 
through a service model. This view is echoed by Fibre-gen management. It offers value to 
both harvesters and processors. To harvesters it means they can use stiffness information to 
optimise their log-making decisions and segregate all logs into quality classes as they are 
cut, to be sold separately. To log processors it offers a more consistent, segregated supply; a 
proposition particularly appealing to LVL mills which struggle to find the high-strength logs 
they require amongst the domestic log supply. 
The PH330 has gone through 5 major validation studies, which have proven the concept but 
raised issues with the accuracy of the stiffness measured compared to that of the HM200. 
This is primarily a result of the fact that it is limited to the less-accurate time of flight 
approach. Recent studies have shown that this accuracy could be improved by including 
physical log parameters, already measured by the processor heads, into the model. Work is 
ongoing to incorporate these into the unit, and some work remains to improve its 
robustness. Some external funding and support may be available from Scion and the Wood 
Quality Initiative to continue development. 
4.4 Current ownership 
“Fibre-gen” consists of three legal entities: an IP holding entity, a holding company, and an 
operating company. [Redacted] and [redacted] have significant interests in each of these. 
Four other minority shareholders make up the balance. The current ownership structure is 
given as Appendix A.  
[Redacted]. 
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4.5 Key people 
[Redacted] 
4.6 Market  
4.6.1 Size  
Operating under their current sales model it is estimated that the domestic addressable 
market for Fibre-gen is NZ$1.5m annually, and NZ$150m globally. 
Operating under the proposed service model it is estimated that the domestic addressable 
market for the Fibre-gen unit would be NZ$4m annually, and NZ$400m globally. 
Details of these size calculations are given as Appendix C. 
4.6.2 Dynamics 
Most mills are able to identify poor performing log suppliers or forests retrospectively and 
just avoid buying from them again. Millers pride themselves on their experience that allows 
them to do this – meaning they are reluctant to use tools which imply their judgement is 
insufficient. 
Even fast-grown timber typically has a crop life of 25 years. This means that wood supply is 
essentially fixed at any point in time. To increase revenues wood growers can only look to 
identify and recover the value that is in the trees that they have. This is driving uptake of 
automation and electronic optimisation technologies. 
The price premium commanded by high strength logs is rapidly diminishing. This is deemed 
unlikely to simply be a result of the global financial difficulties – it is caused by 
disproportionate increases in price for low-end logs which precede these difficulties. The 
likely driver of this is the “China Effect”: an extreme demand for logs for low-end end uses 
which has almost completely eroded the price premium for structural logs, demonstrated by 
the figure below. 
 
     Figure 5: New Zealand Log Prices (New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries, 2013). 
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Decreases in rotation age of plantation timber are causing decreases in average quality 
levels and increases in variability. 
Demand for timber is increasingly becoming more for its fibre-content, for use in 
remanufacturing, as opposed to traditional lumber products. This is further driving up 
demand for lower quality timber, reducing the price premium for quality timber.  
4.7 Concerns with current model 
There are a number of areas of concern for Fibre-gen as an investment opportunity in its 
current form. There are four main contributors to this:  
 A modest globally addressable market – meaning high levels of market penetration 
will be required to achieve desirable revenues; 
 The lack of a clear customer – their technology offers significant benefits to the 
industry as a whole, but the value proposition to any one entity is limited meaning 
there are few willing to pay;  
 The erosion of the price premium commanded by structural logs – Fibre-gen’s value 
proposition fundamentally relies on the ability to sell higher strength logs for a 
significant premium, which is no longer the case in many large markets; and 
 In order for Fibre-gen to represent an attractive opportunity, powerHouse’s 
investment would need to facilitate rapid growth; it is difficult to see what 
investment by powerHouse could fundamentally change to deliver this growth. 
4.8 Summary 
Fibre-gen has developed effective tools to salve what appears to be a significant market 
pain – 10% yield losses and poor process control. However, market interaction has revealed 
there is little market pull for Fibre-gen’s products; customers appear happy accept these 
largely unrealised losses as a natural part of their industry. 
The reasons for this can be seen to be largely outside Fibre-gen’s sphere of influence, 
factors well-described by PEST analysis: politically, the 2008 Free Trade Agreement exposed 
New Zealand’s log supply to the vast demand presented by a rapidly developing China, 
driving up the demand and price for low-quality logs; economically, the 2007 financial crisis 
supressed new residential construction in key international markets, reducing the demand 
and price for high-quality logs; and technologically, recent advances in wood manufacturing 
techniques have disproportionately increased the demand and price for low-quality logs as a 
fibre-source for remanufacturing.  
The result is a market in which log prices are high and largely unaffected by quality. This 
means wood growers are scarcely motivated to use Fibre-gen’s tools as logs already fetch 
good prices, and there is little premium to be gained from identifying high-quality logs. For 
wood processors, on the other hand, the high log-price means they are unwilling to demand 
the use of Fibre-gen’s tools to avoid paying any more for logs. This, combined with the 
natural inertia of the status quo, has significantly eroded Fibre-gen’s value-proposition, 
making it extremely difficult for the business to flourish.  
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It should be noted that changes in the global market continue to occur, meaning this may 
change in future. However, as it is almost impossible to accurately predict these changes, 
any reliance on them to predicate an investment decision would carry a high degree of risk. 
5. WoodCoxiii 
For timber processors struggling to optimise value recovery,  
WoodCo demonstrates timber’s true quality,  
allowing them to avoid those 10% of logs that cause 90% of problems. 
Unlike external measurements and rules of thumb, WoodCo describes timber as it 
is, not how it looks. 
– WoodCo Positioning Statement 
While it appears Fibre-gen may not represent an attractive investment as they are, it is 
believed that the incorporation of their technologies with others under the banner of 
“WoodCo” will overcome the aforementioned issues and represent an attractive 
investment. 
WoodCo aims to be the defining source of timber quality. It will do this by measuring a 
range of timber quality attributes from the point of harvest, tracking these against each 
individual log, and using this information to help optimise wood-flow throughout the whole 
supply-chain. The system proposed is illustrated overleaf, with specific technology sources 
identified in Appendix E. 
  
                                                          
xiii
 “WoodCo” is used as a temporary name to talk about the proposed venture. 
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5.1 Proposed WoodCo system overview 
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5.2 Value proposition hypotheses 
“To become more profitable we need to better understand what wood is, 
particularly what good wood is, what key properties we need to measure in all 
stages of the value chain, and we need to understand what this means to the end 
user. We then need to develop tools that can help us to make these assessments, 
but we have to be able to implement this technology in such a way that the costs 
do not outweigh the benefits.”  
– Bill Dyck, Key Note Speaker, 2003 International Precision Forestry Symposium 
(Dyck, 2003) 
The most compelling proposition is that offered to timber processors. However, to deliver 
this, the system must be applied early in the supply-chain, hence it must also offer 
compelling value propositions to the harvesters and harvest managers to motivate system 
uptake by these parties. 
Group Value proposition hypothesis 




 Sell logs more easily by being able to demonstrate their quality.  




 Increase grade recovery and predictability by only processing 
appropriate logs.  
 Increase accessibility of supply by identifying all acceptable logs. 
 Reduce wastage due to warping by removing warp-prone logs from 
supply. 
 Reduce wasted processing costs by increasing the accuracy of grade 
recovery. 
End users  Quantify the environmental benefit of purchasing a timber product. 
 Demonstrate the sustainability and legality of timber products’ 
production. 
 Demonstrate if chemicals of concern have been used in the 
production of a timber product. 
Table 3: Value proposition hypotheses 
5.3 Business model hypotheses 
As the value offered by WoodCo is ultimately realised by wood processors, they are believed 
to be the ultimate customer. As a result of their capital constraints, particularly for un-
tested products, a service-based business model appears to be the most appropriate. The 
proposed service model is shown in the following figure. 
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Figure 6: Proposed WoodCo business model 
It is suggested that the amount charged be linked to the quality of the timber as measured 
by WoodCo. This maximises the systems relevance across the variable resource, spreads the 
capital cost of providing the hardware over the largest possible revenue stream, minimises 
the barriers processors face to adopt the system, and provides WoodCo with sustainable, 
repeating revenues. 
5.4 Launch market  
The launch market would be measuring the stiffness of logs using the Fibre-gen PH330 
technology. This has an estimated annual addressable market of NZ$4m annually within 
New Zealand, and NZ$400m globally. These calculations are shown in Appendix C.  
WoodCo is particularly well suited to the New Zealand market as the dominant species, the 
Radiata Pine, exhibits particularly significant variation in its mechanical properties, with 
average stiffness values lower than those required for high-value structural lumber 
production. 
5.5 Growth hypothesis 
WoodCo will begin by measuring stiffness at the point of harvest for each log. It will target 
Structural and LVL processors through the use of quantified benefit models. This will allow 
the development of relationships and channels through which further developments can be 
deployed. 
It will then develop and implement the RFID tagging system. This will allow quality attributes 
to be traced against each log, and provide the data necessary for the development of log 
trading, tracking and transport optimisation functionalities. The development of these will 
expand the globally addressable market to an estimated figure of NZ$800m annuallyxiv. 
                                                          
xiv
 This is a very high-level, top down estimate which was necessitated by time constraints. Details of 
the calculation are included in Appendix C. 
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Once this platform is developed, additional sensors for measuring the stability of logs can be 
added. This would be expected to increase the globally addressable market to an estimated 
NZ$1.2b annuallyxv. 
5.6 Exit strategy 
Exit for a company of this type would typically be as via trade sale to a large company in the 
Forestry market.  A number of large companies, most notably Trimble, John Deere and 
Komatsu are actively acquiring in this space, however it should be noted that companies are 
typically well-established before acquisition. 
It is believed that WoodCo would represent an attractive acquisition for these companies 
for a number of reasons, mainly: 
 It is somewhat analogous to Asset Forestry Ltd, a Christchurch-based producer of 
forestry logistics systems, which was acquired by Trimble in 2013 for an undisclosed 
sum; 
 It is in line with the growth strategy intimated by the New Zealand Waratah (owned 
by John Deere) sales rep, where they see their growth coming through the 
increased utilisation of sensors to inform processor-head bucking optimisation 
models; and 
 It is in line with broader acquisition trends towards integrated industry-wide 
optimisation systems and the integration of sensors into these. 
Large players and an analogous deal can be found in Appendix G.  
5.7 Key assumptions 
While the work done to date suggests that WoodCo presents an attractive investment, a 
number of key assumptions remain to be validated. These include that: 
 Fibre-gen technology can be licensed in. 
 Timber processors earn a significant premium for high-quality products in all major 
markets. 
 RFID technology can be obtained, and cost-effectively and reliably applied in 
practise. 
 Stability can be measured accurately on a log by log basis in-field. 
 Timber harvesters will be willing to physically segregate different log classes. 
 This model is equally applicable in large foreign markets (e.g. those with slower 
grown forests). 
 Uptake will be fast enough to overcome the network effect inherent in the model. 
 Freedom to operate exists or can be acquired in each of the functional areas. 
 Fibre-gen patents are strong and enforceable in all key international markets 
(particularly South American, North American and European markets). 
 Log processors consider measuring every log, as opposed to samples of logs, 
valuable.  
                                                          
xv
 Likewise. 
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 Low-end lumber prices will not be increased as a result of increased demand from 
engineered wood product manufacturers e.g. CLT. 
 The benefit to processors can be quantified. 
 Sale/supply contracts in industry can be changed to include premiums for quality 
timber. 
5.8 Summary  
“[There is a] broken chain from forest to building industry” 
– Professor Robert Kligerxvi 
By representing timber as a digital entity through the use of established RFID technologies, 
WoodCo presents the opportunity to apply the full power of information technology to the 
Forestry industry. By combining this with proprietary measurement technologies, WoodCo 
presents an opportunity to provide the Forestry industry with insight previously considered 
impossible. 
To wood growers it presents the opportunity to maximise the return provided by their 
forests, not just the revenue. To timber processors it presents the opportunity to gain the 
control and visibility of their supply that they require to gain control of their outputs. Finally, 
to consumers rapidly demanding more sustainably & ethically produced goods, WoodCo 
provides visibility of their provenance.  
By offering value less sensitive to market fluctuations, WoodCo is able to overcome those 
market forces currently impacting on Fibre-gen, and is well-placed to capitalise should those 
forces abate. 
Finally, by offering value to a large and well-established market, and with indications of 
significant acquisition interest, WoodCo presents an attractive opportunity not only as a 
business, but as an investment. 
6.  Conclusions 
Fibre-gen appears to have been the unfortunate victims of market risk: the market rapidly 
changed after their spin-out, with factors outside of their control eroding their value 
proposition to key parties in the supply-chain. As a result, it appears that Fibre-gen does not 
present an attractive investment opportunity in its current form. It is noted that changes in 
market conditions may change this, however, these are impossible to accurately predict.  
A significant difference between the perspectives of industry and academia was noted 
during the project. Whilst academics regularly apply sophisticated approaches to improving 
forestry performance, the prevailing view in industry is one of scepticism towards these 
approaches – resulting in an industry preference for innovations in the form of bigger, 
better versions of current tools; not fundamentally different approaches. To overcome this 
any new technology-based venture must prioritise an apparent simplicity to users, and take 
                                                          
xvi
 Attributed in MOORE, J. R. 2012. Growing Fit-For-Purpose Structural Timber: What’s the Target and 
How Do We Get There? NZ Journal of Forestry, 57. 
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care to down-play the technical aspects of their products in favour of a focus on the job it 
does for foresters in terms they understand and can relate to. 
Finally, there is no doubt that the variability inherent in commercial Forestry is poorly 
managed, and compounded by the fact that information flow through the supply-chain is 
also poor. Therefore, there is definitely a commercial opportunity to be found in providing 
the means to better manage this variability. In the words of Professor Robert Kliger, 
Professor of Structural Engineering at Chalmers University, there is a “broken chain from 
forest to building industry”. The opportunity is for WoodCo to fix this chain. 
7. Recommendations 
Based on the work performed it is recommended that powerHouse: 
Continue building a formal investment case for a company, WoodCo, that licenses in Fibre-
gen’s acoustic and processor-head platform IP to be combined with tracking and other 
measurement technologies. This should look to involve industry experts and validate the 
assumptions listed in section 5.7 as early as possible. 
Grow relationship with Scion. Scion is New Zealand’s leading Forestry research institution. It 
works on a number of different projects and is making moves to increase commercialisation 
activities as part of its ongoing strategy, making it a natural fit for partnership with 
powerHouse.  
Investigate telematics research occurring at UC. This research is looking to enable remotely-
operated logging activities. By allowing work to be performed remotely, removing people 
from the forest floor, this begins to offer a solution to the industry’s most pressing pain: that 
their people keep getting hurt and killed. There is no question the industry is moving 
towards this.  
8. Statement of personal value 
This project was much harder than I anticipated. Whilst a lot of the theoretical aspects are 
easily stated and understood, their practical application has been the single largest 
challenge of my MEM. I think for that reason alone, the project has been immensely 
valuable. A number of key lessons were also learnt. The following table documents these, 
both to demonstrate the amount gained by the student, and to serve as an aide to those 
undergoing similar projects in future.
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Category Issue Problem/success Impact Resolution/recommendation 
General. Overworking. A significant amount of extra work 
was carried out concurrently to 
this project, both related and 
unrelated to the MEM. In 
attempting to keep up with this, I 
worked a significant number of 
consecutive 12+ hour days and 
weekends. 
While at the time I felt that this 
was merely a case of working 
hard, it is apparent in hindsight 
that my hourly productivity was 
significantly impaired, meaning 
that had I enjoyed more breaks 
and given myself more time off, I 
likely would have achieved the 
same results in a reduced 
timeframe. 
Always be aware of looking after 
the ‘human-factors’ of projects, 
even when it appears that time to 
do so is a luxury which is not 
available. Additionally, while much 
of the work was unavoidable (e.g. 
moving house) had a longer term 
view been taken during my 
planning it would have been 
possible to spread some of the 
workload over a longer period. 
Such a long-term view should be 
taken in future projects. 
General. Diminishing 
returns. 
When looking into Fibre-gen’s 
products, wood quality and value 
chain issues I found myself 
reading a lot of papers to deepen 
my understanding of the 
technology and the industry. 
In hindsight it’s clear that much of 
this time was wasted as, while 
useful for developing my 
understanding of the industry, 
much of the detail I was 
uncovering added little value to 
the investment case. 
Be mindful of diminishing returns 
during future work. It was good to 
have learnt this early on in the 
project. 
General Researching in 
the real world. 
In market sizing there were a 
number of data-points which 
were required but could not be 
easily identified. Where for 
academic research they could 
often be either assumed or left 
unknown, in this case they were 
required. 
This meant it was necessary to 
think laterally to find proxies for 
each data point, and use different 
kinds of research tools (e.g. site-
indexed searches from multiple 
providers) to dig out the 
information. 
Utilise advanced search 
techniques to find required 
information. If information still 
cannot be found then look to find 
sensible proxies. 
17/02/2014 Building an investment case. Version 3.1 Page 27 of 53 
General. The importance 
of networks. 
When beginning to analyse Fibre-
gen I completely lacked any 
information about its context. 
By utilising several contacts of 
powerHouse staff I was able to 
quickly get the input of people 
with significant knowledge of the 
forestry industry. 
Do not underestimate the power 
of networks and utilise them more 
effectively. 
General. The importance 
of proper 
documentation. 
In the market-sizing there were a 
number of implicit assumptions.  
Both to identify them for later 
testing and to demonstrate the 
validity of the sizing it was 
necessary to document clearly & 
concisely where each figure in the 
model came from and why they 
were processed the way they 
were. 
This allowed others to more easily 
peer review work, and allowed me 
to ensure I had identified all key 
assumptions. 
Ensure that work performed is 
properly documented. Do not 
omit this when subject to time 
pressure.  
Commercialisation. Talking to 
customers. 
Talking to customers gets spoken 
about a lot and I felt pretty 
comfortable with the idea in 
theory, but in reality I was 
surprised at how reluctant I was 
when it came time to actually get 
out from behind the desk. Once I 
did, I was impressed by the insight 
that they gave me into the issues 
they face and the industry, and 
also how passionate they became 
when asked about the 
hypothesised problem. 
Significantly improved the insight 
gained into Fibre-gen and the 
Forestry industry. 
Always ensure that customers are 
intimately involved through non-
structured interactions. 
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Commercialisation. Sizing markets. When it came time to size 
markets for Fibre-gen I had no 
idea how to approach the 
problem. 
Had to think laterally and find a 
way to reasonably estimate the 
market sizes using a bottom-up 
approach. 
Think laterally to construct 
bottom-up market models in 
whichever way seems reasonable. 
Use proxies where necessary and 
“sanity checks” wherever possible. 
List all assumptions made in 
constructing the model. 
Commercialisation. Non-financial 
outcomes. 
In identifying who would actually 
pay for more information in the 
wood value chain it was difficult 
to identify who would financially 
benefit from it, i.e. who would be 
the customer. 
It was necessary to consider both 
financial & non-financial 
outcomes when looking at 
benefits, eg who makes more 
money as a result of the 
information and whose job is 
made easier? 
Look at both financial and non-
financial benefits that products 
and services offer. 
Commercialisation. Identifying 
needs. 
It was difficult to assess the 
informational needs of the 
forestry industry. 
Use ODI and the job map as a 
framework for identifying ways in 
which a job could be made easier. 
This made identifying the 
information needs of the forestry 
industry significantly easier. 
Use ODI principles when assessing 
customer needs. 
Table 4: Key lessons learned 
Ultimately this project has made for an excellent introduction to the real world, given me both insight and a head-start into the career I want to 
lead, and I like to think it has left me significantly less naïve than the wide-eyed student that began the project.  
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 – Fibre-gen patents Appendix A
[Redacted] 
Table 5: Fibre-gen patents 
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 – Fibre-gen ownership structure Appendix B
[Redacted] 
Figure 7: Fibre-gen ownership structure 
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 – Market size calculations Appendix C
i. Fibre-gen sales model 
 











Handheld unit for assessing 
felled trees and logs. 
VP: Get more $$ for logs by 
matching to highest value 
appropriate use. 
1000 10.00% $12,000.00 5 $240,000.00 - Each logging crew (number of logging workers in NZ 
/ number of loggers per crew) would potentially buy a 
single unit, 
- That they buy them themselves and are not 
provided by the client/forest manager, 
- 10% uptake: likely to be at the low end as currently 
the value proposition for these groups is poor, 




Handheld unit for assessing 
felled trees and logs. 
VP: Get more $$ for logs by 
matching to highest value 
use. 
50 30.00% $12,000.00 5 $36,000.00 - Each structural mill would potentially buy one unit, 
- 30% uptake: likely to be similar as larger mills 
currently have a few but are uncommon amongst 
smaller mills, 
- That it is only relevant to structural mills, 
- That is relevant to structural mills of all sizes, 
- That verified mills are analogous to the structural 
mills, 




VP:Verify average sonic 
speeds of shipments from 
different sources. Identify 
good logs from stands 
where all logs are assumed 
to be poor and recover 
more value. 
180 30.00% $16,000.00 5 $172,800.00 - That there are 180 forestry consultants who would 
each potentially buy a single unit, 
- 30% uptake: likely as tool provides them with a new 
revenue stream; most users at the moment are 
consultants, 




Handheld unit for assessing 
standing trees. 
VP: Increase accuracy of 
grade yield predictions. 
Increase accuracy of 
valuations. 
180 10.00% $16,000.00 5 $57,600.00 - That there are 180 forestry consultants who would 
each potentially buy a single unit, 
- 10% uptake: likely to be at the low end as currently 
the value proposition for these groups is poor, 
- They replace their units every 5 years. 




Handheld unit for assessing 
standing trees. 
VP: Measuring/studying 
wood properties. Identify 
best trees for breeding. 
10 60.00% $16,000.00 5 $19,200.00 - That Scion would buy 7 acoustic devices and each of 
UC, Massey and Waiaraki teaching institutions would 
potentially buy a single unit; 
- That 60% of them would use Fibre-gen not 
competing products (eg Treetap, Fakopp), 
- They replace their units every 5 years. 
LG640 Mill-based unit. 
VP: Increase recovery of 
high-grade timber. Reduce 
costs of processing poor 
logs. 
50 10.00% $150,000.00 10 $75,000.00 - Each structural mill would potentially buy one unit, 
- 60% uptake: based on impression from 
conversations, 
- That it is only relevant to structural mills, 
- That is is relevant to structural mills of all sizes, 
- That verified mills are analogous to the structural 
mills, 
- That it is not replaced by 
Tomography\interferometer systems, 
- That each unit costs $150,000, and 
- They replace their units every 10 years. 
PH330 Processor head based unit. 
VP: Make best log-making 
decisions eg if wood is 
structural quality cut to 
structural length. 
40 20.00% $88,000.00 10 $704,000.00 - That 50% of people who buy a new processor head 
will add a PH330, 
- They replace their units every 10 years. 
                
      Predicted 
annual NZ 
market size 
$1,304,600.00   
 
     Total potential 
NZ market 
$61,220,000.00   
Notes          
- Annual market size taken to be the sum of (potential users * take up * cost per unit) / lifetime of unit, except for the PH330 line as the potential number of users is the number of processor 
heads sold in NZ per year. 
- Potential market size taken to be the sum of (potential users * cost per unit). 
- Uptake %'s inferred from general conversations with industry participants, not specific "would you buy X" questions/surveys. 
- Cannibalising effect of tools not specifically quantified. 
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ii. PH330 service model 
Market sizing done was done using the following formula as bottom-up sizing was not 
feasible:  
(Sawlog production)*(25% highest quality timber)*($2 per metre cubed finder’s fee). 
These figures are acknowledged to be crude estimates; data for more accurate sizing was 
not able to be found. 
Domestic sawlog production was calculated using NZ Ministry for Primary Industries data to 
be 1,000,000m3 per annum. 
Global sawlog production was calculated using Eurostat European Commission figures to be 
approximately 850,000,000m3 per annum. 
Productivity of a processor-head was found from industry interviews to be 180,000m3 per 
annum. 
This gives a domestic addressable market of 4m NZD per annum and a global market of 
400m NZD per annum.  
This is approximately 25% of the published global market size for processor-heads which 
suggest it is reasonable. 
iii. WoodCo RFID service model 
Scaled PH330 model by a factor of two - assuming RFID offers a similar amount of value to 
the rest of industry as stiffness testing. This is borne out by preliminary interviews, especially 
in light of the fact that this also adds value to low-quality logs. 
iv. WoodCo stability measurement service model 
This adds a market of equivalent size to the PH330 as a result of the fact that stability has an 
equal or larger impact on processors, suggesting its measurement will offer them at least 
the same amount of value. 
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 – Key wood characteristics and properties Appendix D
 
Figure 8: Key wood micro and macro properties (Walker, 2006) 
17/02/2014 Building an investment case. Version 3.1 Page 38 of 53 




RFID Tags Confidex. Confidex developed an RFID tag especially for use in the 
forest supply-chain, as part of the Swedish “Indisputable 
Key” (IK) project in 2010. It does not appear to have 
been commercialised. A cursory patent search found no 
relevant issued patents. 
Tag applicator Develop in-
house. 
The IK project included the development of a 
mechanised tag applicator. This is understood to be a 
simple mechanical design that could be easily replicated 






This could either be developed in house, or the data 




Fibre-gen. This refers to the platform elements of the Fibre-gen 
design; the hard and soft integrations with existing 
processor-heads and the development of robust sensors. 
Stiffness 
measures 




TBD. There are a number of micro-attributes which lead to 
the bulk property of stability. The exact impact of each of 
these, and how each can be measured in the field, 






Fibre-gen are currently looking to integrate these. There 
is some debate over their accuracy, and they may not 
measure characteristics such as sweep, wobble .etc 
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 – Useful contacts Appendix F
[Redacted] 
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 – Exit strategy Appendix G
i. Large players 
John Deere 
 No history of acquisitions found in forestry since Timberjack in 2000.  
 Evidence in wider group of purchasing IP rights to incorporate into their crop 
harvesters.  
 Tend to pursue joint ventures instead of acquire. 
Weiyerhaueser  
 Have patents and R&D in the exact area, and are massive, but no history of 
acquiring small technology companies. 
Trimble 
 Have a forestry division focused on optimization and productivity of supply-chain. 
 Acquired Asset Forestry Ltd (Asset) in September 2013 for an undisclosed amount. 
Asset are a forestry logistics business who provide timber dispatch and inventory 
management IT systems. 
 Have also acquired 2 other NZ tech companies - Actronic Technologies Ltd and IQ 
Irrigation Ltd. 
Komatsu 
 Acquired processor-head manufacturer LogMax in 2012 for NZ$79.4m. 
Integral Ltd 
 Bought ATLAS in October 2013 from Scion. Atlas provide forestry 
management/modelling software. 
ii. Analogous deal: El-Forest AB 
 El-Forest are a Swedish company developing hybrid forwarders (machines for 
transporting logs in-forest) which are more efficient and utilise patented wheel-
track technology to reduce damage to the forest floor and soil. 
 Founded in 2006.  
 38% of shares acquired by Volvo Technology Transfer. Valuation/price unknown. 
 Forwarder trial unit completed in 2009. 
 Had revenues of 3m SEK (NZ$652K) in 2009. 
 Awarded patent for an “electrically propulsed vehicle” in 2010. filed applications for 
2 more. 
 Entered production pilot in 2010. 
 In 2010 Swedish state-owned VC FourierTransform invested 20m SEK (~NZ$3.5m) in 
exchange for 36% shareholding at a pre-money valuation of NZ$~6.2m. They had 7 
employees.  
 As of 2012, FourierTransform carried 48% of El-Forest shares at 27.9m SEK 
(~NZ$5.2m), giving a fair value of ~ NZ$10.8m. 
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 In 2012 revealed a joint-venture with ProSilva for the world’s first electric hybrid 
harvester. 
 In 2013 FourierTransform invested a further 2.5m SEK via a convertible loan. 
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 – Full forestry production chain Appendix H
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 – Industry interviews Appendix I
Throughout this project a number of unstructured interviews were held with various members of the Forestry industry. The following is a record of 
these. 
Company Name Details Phone number Date called Notes 
[redacted] [redacted] Forest/ 
harvest 
managers 
[redacted] 31/10/2013 - Specifications of logs can be whatever demanded by customer; each can 
have different metric requirements. 
- Forest owners would love to get value for what is actually grown. 
- There is no measurement of internal qualities required for export. 
- Density is measured by those "scanny things". 
- Generally what is measured/specified is that which is easy to measure as 
opposed to that which is useful. 
- Forest owners often don't see a financial benefit from investing in 
genetically enhanced seedlings (or maybe can't quantify/predict it when 
making the purchasing decision). 
- Feel too much goes to fibre. 
[redacted] [redacted] Log/lumber 
merchants 
[redacted] 30/10/2013  - Chinese are happy with log consistancy which arises from visual 
segregation 
- One log supplier acoustically screens and only exports logs that aren't 
structural grade; Chinese buyers have noticed this. 
- Echoed that end use of export logs is not for structural purposes, largely 
plywood for shuttering. 
- Export markets not asking for any more information. 
- Could be used to differentiate NZ timber if a comprehensive 
education/marketing plan was conducted. 
[redacted] [redacted] Forest/harves
t managers 
[redacted] 1/11/2013  Really good to talk to - happy to talk again. NB [redacted] has actually been 
involved with [redacted] in the past (found out later). 
 
General 
- Three sectors within forestry - growing, processing, researching. 
- Only ~15% of NZ logs destined for structural use. 
- Very few mills now own their own forests. 
- Three most important log qualities are currently length, diameter and 
branching habit (branches/knots). 
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- Saw mills paying 20-30% more than they used to for timber as a result of 
price pressure from export market. 
- Highest-grade logs get 3x the price of lowest grade. 
 
Stiffness/strength 
- Legislated stiffness testing in NZ for structural lumber. 
- Use of acoustics as an operational tool is NZ ([redacted]) led. 
- Stiffness is the only internal characteristic actually measured. 
- Is measured either before or immediately after log merchandising. 
- Used in pacific-northwest in the US. 
- Acoustics not widely used because 1.) Cost, 2.) Different interests of 
buyers/sellers eg sellers don’t care too much about buyers’ grade 
recovery, just want largest price for their product.  
- Sometimes you don’t want to measure stiffness if you’re just going to 
show it’s not good enough! 
- Thinks stiffness testing would be more important for higher value timbers 
than radiata. 
- Stiffness testing important selling to LVL mills.  
- Age matters for stiffness. Mills often order with both minimum diameter 
and ages - younger fast-grown wood is less stiff. 
- Few stiffness/stability issues for radiata, but significant issues for 
Eucalypts as they are much more variable and much more difficult to 
grow. Little research into commercialising Eucalypts. 
 
Density 
- Unimportant during log making.  
- Is very important for conversion between volumetric measures and 
green tonnes. 
- Log buyers/mills are interested in density. 
 
Fibre length 
- Not important for merchandising nor milling.  
- Important for pulping and paper making.  
- Shorter fibres needed for making fine paper. Industry currently uses tree 
species typified by short fibres - tawa or eucalypts. 
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Knotty core size 
- Occurs in pruned trees. Is the diameter of tree when pruned for first 
time.  
- Lumber is only recoverable in the sheath between the knotty core and 
the small end diameter. 
- Difficult to measure the size of the knotty core. 
- Can potentially halve rate of lumber recovery.  
- Currently mills often mill a sample of logs before fixing a price to check 
clearwood recovery. 
- Scion developed a certification scheme which would give confidence 
around the knotty core, but this didn’t really fly. 
 
Corewood 
- Not a big issue.  
 
Knots and branches  
- Very important. 
- Same as one another. 
- Assessed in bands by diameter eg no knot/branches, 0-7cm diameter etc. 
- Heavy knotting/branching is only OK for pulp. 
- Chinese don’t care as much about branching habits. 
 
Export 
- Macro features most important. 
- Primary use is for concrete formwork! 
- NZ industry is unsophisticated; like sending unprocessed sheep carcasses 
to the UK, ideally would process here. 
- A lot of water is transported. 
 
MFA 
- Most important cellular aspect that determines behaviour/properties. 
- No commercial tools available. 
- Lot of interest in x-ray technology to assist in optimisation of lumber 
recovery in mills.  
- A long way off operational deployment. 
- Field assessment would only be useful for high-end timbers. 
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- Could be used to differentiate NZ Radiata as a high-end product. 
[redacted] [redacted] Forest/harves
t managers 
[redacted] 30/10/2013  - Measure stand PLI and density 
- Focus is on volume recovery 
[redacted] [redacted] Wood 
scientist 
[redacted] 1/11/2013 Referred by [Redacted]. Emailed to organise a time to call. 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 1/11/2013  General 
- Chinese effect on log prices and wood-flows is the single largest 
challenge for sawmillers. 
- Sonics heavily used in North Zealand. 
- Try to only buy sonic rated logs, and use the sonic mill unit and find it 
really good. 
- China determines log prices. 
 
Logs 
- Look for a structural log sonic rating. 
- Max knot diameter. 
- Min 30cm SED. 
- Find log sonic rating means grade outturns can be accurately predicted. 
[redacted] [redacted] Forest/harves
t managers 
[redacted] 5/11/2013  - Visual log grading is the norm.  
- Everything is market-driven; if the mills etc require sonic testing or 
incentivise it then it will be done. 
- No price premium for sonic tested logs. 
- Age of trees is important. 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 5/11/2013  - Segregate pruned and K-grade logs out. 
- Get consistant returns from log grades as-is. 
- Not making structural lumber. 
[redacted] [redacted] Mll [redacted] 5/11/2013  - Optical scanners are used to detect knots etc. 
- They don't produce structural lumber so don't care too much. 
- Optical scanners made a big difference. 
- Happy to talk again. 
[redacted] [redacted] Forest/harves
t managers 
[redacted] 6/11/2013 - Cost of implementation is a big issue for uptake of stiffness tools. 
- Timbertech is used in industry for scanning logs. 
- Sonic testing largely done for samples. 
- Wider adoption of sonics wood be good for industry. 
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- Low quality timber is sometimes left on the ground if haulage costs are 
too high. 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 6/11/2013 - If done, Sonic testing is mainly done on site.  
- Main issue is cost. 
- Main issue for mills is log supply/price - forest managers only care about 
$$$ return. 
- Fibre recovery = Volume recovery. 
- Speed of processing is important. 
- 4 Important things for mills: 
-- Fibre recovery 
-- Grade outturn 
-- Cutting to order - matching sales requirements to resources. 
-- Reducing costs - going faster and improving accuracy. 
- For most mills a sawlog is a sawlog, they trust it will give them the grade 
recovery they need. They do monitor and trace back if it doesn't however. 
- Would like an email about wood quality findings: [redacted] 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 6/11/2013 - Visual grading is the norm. 
- Use [redacted]’s tools to assess quality of suppliers. 
- Need to show that acoustic tools are worth-while, quantify the benefits 
to processors eg: "x% stiffness increase corresponds to $yyy extra revenue 
or zzz m3 extra recovery". 
- Stiffness can be a big problem, moreso down south. 
- Two important measures are core density and sonics. Density is 
commonly supplied.  
- Would be good to have tech to make on the fly value optimisation 
decisions for making log grades. 
- Was involved with [redacted] trial ~4 years ago, worked and thought was 
headed in right direction but not robust enough. 
- Most decisions are currently made on stand average values. 
- Large variation in forests but hard to cost-effectively segregate. 
- What to do with timber that is not up to scratch? Once you've taken the 
good stuff who will buy the bad stuff? 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 6/11/2013 - Use acoustic segregation in the yard to determine the cut patterns. 
- Big mills are sonic testing, is too expensive for smaller mills.  
- Difficult for mills to justify investment in expensive tech when log supply 
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is uncertain. 
- Appearance grade is lower value than structural. 
- Believes they are one of the few mills who sonically test logs. 
- Does give them higher levels of grade recovery. 
- MiCROTEC too expensive. 
- Think chord and defect scanning is important, avoiding pith (middle 10 
growth rings). 
- Sonics shift focus from fibre recovery to grade recovery. 
- Increasing grade recovery by 1-2% justifies a volume reduction of 1-2%. 
- Seems there would be an opportunity for cheaper Sonic Testing/different 
business model? 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 6/11/2013 - Have a [redacted] tool but don't use it: call [redacted]. 
- Want higher density logs primarily. 
- [redacted] can tell some things but doesn't supply a complete picture. 
- Would be most useful if stiffness testing happened on unloading of logs 
as it is often too late to reject logs after that point. 
- Primarily rely on experience. 
- Cutting logs to order is important. 
- A big issue is stone detection in logs as this can bugger mill equipment. 
- Average stiffness of a log is maybe not that useful. 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 7/11/2013 - Use the [redacted] tool a little bit. 
- Still order merely based on visual characteristics and geographic source. 
- Density is very important. 
- Have sonics but largely just monitor grade out-turn from different 
sources and rely on experience. 
- Some mills use [redacted] tool to segregate logs into board logs, 
structural logs, etc. 
- Strength is largely graded by visual assessment of knot size and location 
as an override for acoustic grading. 
- Far North and Nelson have good high-grade structural recovery. 
- Stones, sand and gravel are a big problem as they can very quickly 
damage blades. Somewhat mitigated by washing, debarking and trimming 
the logs first, but if you don't do all you get problems. 
- Wants xray tech to allow him to look into logs and identify knots etc to 
improve strength outturn, but is far too expensive. 
- Some accuracy issues for visual grading. 
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- Happy to talk again. 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 7/11/2013 - Use some [redacted] tools in the yard. 
- Density testing is important. 
- Density measured by weighing log. 
- Interpine do random sampling of wood supplies using [redacted] tools. 
- Segregate log supply in yard into logs that will yield SG8 and fibre/export 
material logs. 
- No real issues with stones and sand after debarking and washing. 
- Wants scanners to replace visual graders as these are the main sources 
of output quality problems. 
[redacted] [redacted] Forestry 
operations 
[redacted] 11/11/2013 - Need to demonstrate internal characteristics becoming more important 
with fast growing plantations. 
- Fibre strength, fibre/lignin contents are important to pulp-makers. 
- [redacted] may be a joint development with a Scottish company. 
- Key limitation of uptake of acoustics are contracts: don't require/pay a 
premium for wood shown to be stiffer. Would be good for industry and 
industry is moving that way. 
- Needs to be easily integrated to existing log-making systems. 
- About 40% of Australian timber doesn't make structural grade. 
- Stiffness is most important property. 
- Pulp yield prediction is really important - a 1% increase in pulp yield can 
be worth $1,000,000 for large pulp mills. 
- Again contracts aren't structured to recognise better internal 
characteristics - may enforce a minimum requirement though. 
- Gluability is important for engineered wood products. 
- Knotty core only relevant to pruned logs. 
- Forest owners normally have multiple customers they can send different 
products (eg log qualities) to. 
- Segregation currently occurs based on external characteristics. 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 8/11/2013 - Inspect loads of logs when they arrive to ensure they are in spec. 
- Every month trace clearwood recovery back to suppliers. 
- Ranks every source via PLI (Pruned Log Index), resin analysis and for 
inter-ring checking. 
- Run mill trials to determine wood quality. 
- Fletcher developed their own tool that they're contractually OK to use. 
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- Take a wood density score with each load. 
- Just want to stop particularly bad supply. 
- Knotty/defect core is important. 
- Online, real-time quality management would be good. 
- Sonics essential within structural mills. 
- No faith at all in stading tree tool. 
- Only uses sonics when required by customer. 
[redacted] [redacted] Log purchaser [redacted] 13/11/2013 - Not really the right person to talk to. 
- Said defect core was a big issue for pruned logs as no idea of pruning 
quality beforehand. 
[redacted] [redacted] Pulp mill [redacted] 13/11/2013 - Density most important. 
- Uses a knowledge of what comes from where to predict likely quality. 
- Control fibre-length by altering proportion of saw-mill chips in each 
batch. 
- With logs you more or less "get what you get". 
- Believes density is a good proxy for fibre-length. 
- Would find more information useful but wouldn't pay more for it; feels 
he basically has enough information. 
- Would want to measure fibre-length better if saw-mills close reducing 
the available supply of chip. 
- Many variables define pulp yield, more info would be useful. 
- Would be useful if mechanised harvesting equipment could capture 
more data, store in a DB, then link to individual logs via RFID. 
- "When Asian markets are happy to take anything then it impacts the 
behaviour of suppliers". 
- Stop selling as weight and start selling as volume. 
[redacted] [redacted] Pulp mill [redacted] 13/11/2013 Call back. Emailed questions through. 
[redacted] [redacted] Pulp mill [redacted] 13/11/2013 - Pretty happy with wood supply - they get it from the same 
people/regions so know more or less what they're getting. 
- 75% of their fibre supply is from sawmill chips from structural mills - they 
know that this chip will likely have long fibre length and high density. 
- They track wood quality. 
[redacted] [redacted] Harvest 
manager 
[redacted] 13/11/2013 - Processing yard is where fulls stems are taken to be bucked up. 
- Density measured during pre-harvest inventory. 
- Bucking decisions based on structural supply and demand. 
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- Density is the only wood supply requirement for Carter Holt Harvey. 
- Don't use [redacted] much. 
- Some wood supply agreements require the use of sonics. 
- Thinks sonics are the equivalent of measuring density. 
- Thinks RFID presents a big opportunity, especially for export market.  
- Room for improvement in density testing. 
[redacted] [redacted] Mill [redacted] 13/11/2013 - Most important parameters are length, SED, knot size. 
- Thinks [redacted] measures density, but they feel they can predict the 
density with ok accuracy based on historical deliveries. 
- Use Metriguard acoustic grader post-processing. 
- 4% of logs in a shipment can be out of Spec. 
- More knowledge sharing would be good. 
- They're the only real veneer sales company. 
[redacted] [redacted] Forest/harves
t managers 
[redacted] 13/11/2013 - Nett stumpage returns heavily impacted by location. 
- Mills have issues if wood is too young. 
- Use [redacted] sometimes. 
- [redacted] used for logs going into NPI, McAlpine. 
[redacted] [redacted] Forest/harves
t managers 
[redacted] 13/11/2013 - Happy to talk again 
- Mainly external physical characteristics measured at harvest 
- Log suppliers sometimes do QC by sampling random truckloads for 
compliance with specification; about 2% of total supply. 
- Log purchasers may also do QC in a similar way 
- Logs are chosen based on average values resulting from a knowledge of 
regions and forests 
- Sonic tools give an accurate measure of wood strength. Used to give an 
exact cut-off acoustic velocity for structural logs. 
- Marginal forests are the main users of tools to segregate logs on the skid 
site 
- Kaingaroa processing facility takes full stems and optimally bucks them 
and sounds like [redacted] is used. 
- No price premium for supplying sonic measurements, a structural log is a 
structural log. 
[redacted] [redacted] Processor 
head sales 
[redacted] 6/12/2013 - 35% of NZ felling uses processor heads 
- 300 Waratah heads in operation in NZ 
- Heads owned by contractors, generally between 1 head and 5 
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- Range from $200k to $300k installed 
- Use of heads with cut to length optimisation mandated by big forests 
- Main selling point to contractors is both increased safety and also that it 
is a visible safety measure 
- Advantage of useto contractor is increased throughput 
- Advantage to forest owner of having real data - not "guesstimated" 
- Problem with [redacted]: WHO WILL PAY. 
- Application of RFID is in its infancy and predicted to be huge 
- Bucking optimisation is effective 
- Waratah moving towards integrated sensors to include internal qualities 
in bucking models 
- Multiple log piles on skid sites are not a big issue 
[redacted] [redacted] Log 
production 
manager 
[redacted] 28/1/2013 - Information sharing alone wood be valuable to wood producers; it avoids 
them having to be constantly repeating measurements. 
- Conventional log tagging is quite expensive due to the repeat 
measurements. 
- Logs are cut dependent on the orders the company has.  
- Buying and selling of logs is done differently by all different companies in 
NZ. 
- Over 100 log grades cut in NZ. 
- Uses [redacted] to hit a few logs, don't need to do most as they're from a 
good region. 
- Biggest structural mills are in Kawerau. 
- FSC certification is pretty labour intensive. 
- Pruned mills care about clearwood (cf knotty core). 
- Processor-head measurements are limited and not particularly accurate. 
The operator merely looks for knots, sweep etc on the logs and grades it 
as 1-4. These aren't currently measured by the processor head. 
- Definitely a massive push to more automation. 
- Transport costs are difficult to manage effectively. 
- Increases in logging and transport costs over the value of wood is driving 
innovation in the sector. 
- Overall, just sharing information across the chain would be most 
valuable. 
 
